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Antje Hildebrandt
Too many to fail? Inter-enterprise arrears in transition
economies
Tiivistelmä
Kehittyneissä markkinatalousmaissa kauppaluottoja käytetään yleisesti yritysten välillä
lyhytaikaisessa rahoituksessa. Joissakin siirtymätalouksissa yritysten välisiä luottoja on
kuitenkin kertynyt niin paljon, että ne ovat johtaneet keskinäisiin maksurästeihin. Tässä
tutkimuksessa selvitetään yritysdatan avulla , ovatko kauppaluotot osa normaalia liikekäy-
täntöä vai edustavatko ne pehmeän budjettirajoitteen muotoa. Tulokset antavat aiheen
olettaa, että joissain siirtymätalouksissa kauppaluotot eivät aina ole samalla tavalla osa
normaalia liikekäytäntöä kuin kehittyneissä markkinatalousmaissa. Tämä ongelma on ollut
suurin niissä siirtymätalouksissa, jotka eivät ole uudistaneet talouttaan johdonmukaisesti.






In advanced market economies, the use of trade credits is an im-
portant way of short-term ﬁnancing and considered as being part of
normal business practice. Some transition economies, however, have
experienced a rapid accumulation of trade credits which have led to
interlocking webs of arrears and collective bail outs by the government.
In this paper, ﬁrm-level data is used to test whether trade credits rep-
resent part of normal business practice comparable to advanced mar-
ket economies or whether trade credits are representing a systematic
phenomenon supporting soft budget constraints. The results suggest
that trade credits are not just normal business practice but that they
c a nh a v en e g a t i v es p i l l - o v e re ﬀects on other ﬁrms by worsening their
ﬁnancial situation. We conclude that the problem of interlocking ef-
fects is more pronounced in countries which are less committed to
economic reforms. Some countries have made steady progress in eco-
nomic development while others have lost their momentum and suﬀer
from marked macroeconomic imbalances and weak institutions.
Keywords: transition economies, inter-enterprise arrears, soft
budget constraints
JEL-classiﬁcation: P31,P 3 5 ,L 10
∗This paper was mainly written while I was a visiting researcher at the Bank of Fin-
land’s Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) and I am especially grateful for
the perfect working environment. I thank the participants at the BOFIT seminar for
comments and suggestions I also would like to thank LICOS (Centre for Economies in
Transition) at the K.U. Leuven/Belgium for providing the data.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In advanced market economies, non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms frequently bundle the
supply of capital with the supply of goods by granting trade credits to their
customers. Such trade credits, voluntarily granted and paid back in due time,
are considered part of normal business practice. In many transition countries,
in contrast, trade credits, and more speciﬁcally overdue trade credits (inter-
enterprise arrears), have emerged as a serious policy issue. At the start of
transition, inter-enterprise arrears accumulated so rapidly as to threaten vi-
able ﬁrms with spill-over eﬀects. Some governments responded with bailouts
of indebted ﬁr m st op r e v e n tc a s c a d i n ge n t e r p r i s ef a i l u r e s .
The aim of this paper is to assess whether inter-enterprise arrears are still
an obstacle for economies in transition by strongly linking ﬁrms via payables
and receivables which might eventually result into an interlocking web of ar-
rears. Applying a simple empirical framework, we assess the reasons a ﬁrm
might get into arrears. For this purpose, we use survey data of Hungarian
and Romanian ﬁrms to test for country heterogeneity. The resulting empir-
ical snapshot suggests that trade linkages among Romanian ﬁrms continue
to pose a substantial danger of creating chains of arrears, while this is no
longer the case in Hungary. Apparently, some transition countries handled
the arrears problem better than others. Possible explanations are the level
of institutional development such as working bankruptcy procedures and ﬁ-
nancial intermediation, and, as an essential factor, government commitment
to market reform.
This paper draws mainly on two bodies of literature. We look ﬁrst to the
discussion of trade credits in advanced market economies to understand the
reasons for their extensive use in the presence of a functioning banking sector
and their relation to development of ﬁnancial institutions (e.g. Petersen and
Rajan, 1997; Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). The second relevant
discussion concerns the role of trade credits in relation to the problem of
soft budget constraints (SBCs) in transition economies. As shown by Berglöf
and Roland (1998) and Perotti (1998), strong one-to-one trade linkages of
ﬁrms increase the likelihood of government bailouts. Perotti (1998) notes
the tendency to collusion among ﬁrms when a stabilisation programme lacks
credibility, i.e. anticipating a collective bailout, ﬁrms have incentive to grant
trade credits they know will not be paid back.
We further refer to papers that provide evidence of national arrears crises
2(e.g. Clifton and Khan, 1993; Daianu, 1994; Ickes and Ryterman, 1992 and
1993; Rostowski, 1994), as well as to empirical papers on testing for the
determinants of inter-enterprise arrears in transition economies. Johnson et
al. (1999) use survey data to explain the importance of trust in the deci-
sion to grant trade credits. Trust is determined both by formal and informal
rules. Frydman et al. (2000) use a probit model to test for the probability
of default on obligations to diﬀerent types of creditors depending on, among
other variables, ownership structure. A paper by Calvo and Coricelli (1994)
is particularly relevant for our approach as they empirically test for chains of
arrears in Romania using data for state-owned ﬁrms in 1992, a time immedi-
ately following a general bailout when companies expected further relief. Our
empirical snapshot diﬀers from that of Calvo and Coricelli (1994) in three
crucial respects. First, our more recent survey data is less distorted by the
bailout. Second, our sample is more representative as we include ﬁrms with
various types of owners (i.e. not just state-owned companies). This allows
us to test whether certain types of owners are more prone to accumulate
arrears and whether inter-enterprise arrears are a widespread phenomenon
in a particular country. Additionally, our data set allows us to compare two
countries in transition, Hungary and Romania. They have distinctly diﬀerent
transition experiences, making comparison valuable.
Our results provide striking evidence of the “Great Divide”, noted by
Berglöf and Bolton (2002), that separates central and eastern European coun-
tries (CEECs) today. Some CEECs, including Hungary, continue to make
steady progress in economic development, while others such as Romania have
lost their economic momentum and suﬀer from marked macroeconomic im-
balances and weak institutions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the reasons for the
extensive use of trade credits in advanced market economies and transition
economies are described. The discussion then focuses on the linkages between
trade credits and the problem of soft budget constraints. For illustrative
reasons, Romania’s general bailout is described. Section 3 speciﬁes the data
used for the empirical snapshot in Section 4 where we test for the existence of
chains of arrears. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
32 Trade credits and soft budget constraints
In advanced market economies, non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms routinely act as ﬁnancial
intermediaries by voluntarily granting trade credit to their customers. The
use of trade credits allows the exchange of goods and services to be sepa-
rated in time and place from the simultaneous exchange of money. This is a
fundamental form of short-term external ﬁnancing in market economies and
perhaps the most important source of ﬁnance in the United States (Jaﬀee
and Stiglitz, 1990). In Germany, France and Italy, trade credits constitute
over a quarter of total corporate assets (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic,
2001).
Several explanations for the extensive use of trade credits in advanced
market economies have been put forward. One strand of theories emphasises
the advantages suppliers likely have over ﬁnancial institutions in running
credit checks on their trading partners and in monitoring outstanding trade
credits. Suppliers may well consider themselves to be in a superior position to
ﬁnancial institutions both in acquiring information on their customers’ cred-
itworthiness through their normal business connections and in controlling
and sanctioning a customer’s default on debt (e.g. stopping further deliver-
ies). The use of trade credits may also allow suppliers to price discriminate
where certain pricing policies are otherwise prohibited by law. Moreover, the
provision of trade credits may reduce transaction costs, e.g. by combining
invoices, setting payment schedules or rationalising organisation of invento-
ries (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). A supplying ﬁrm may even be willing to
provide its trading partners with trade credits in situations where ﬁnancial
institutions would have otherwise turned down the trading partner. Here,
it is eﬃcient for the supplier to borrow from banks, while providing trade
credits to customers. The use of trade credits should therefore be positively
correlated with bank lending implying that trade credits depend on the eﬃ-
ciencies of the banking sector of a country. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(2001) provide empirical evidence for this view, demonstrating that informal
credit arrangements between ﬁrms complement development of the bank-
ing sector.1 Overall, the use of trade credits generally leads to an eﬃcient
channeling of short-term capital to their greatest use, even where a ﬁnancial
sector specialised in providing capital exists.
A strikingly diﬀerent situation arose at the start of transition, when many
1Jain (2001) shows theoretically that trade creditors do not compete with banks.
4CEECs had to confront explosions in the use of trade credits and trade ar-
rears. Various explanations of the rapid accumulation of trade credits in these
transition countries have been suggested. The most widely accepted causes
are the credit crunches enterprises faced after stabilisation programmes with
tight ﬁscal policies were implemented (e.g. Calvo and Coricelli, 1994) and the
lack of ﬁnancial discipline of ﬁrms in transition (e.g. Rostowski, 1994). Under
these arguments, trade credits are a peculiar form of credit provided involun-
tarily to trading partners without an expectation of repayment. In fact, trade
credits and trade arrears in CEECs are sometimes considered as part of nor-
mal business practice as in advanced market economies. These arguments
assume that ﬁrms have learned to assert their claims using credit control
mechanisms (Schaﬀer, 1998). Under such assumptions, inter-enterprise ar-
rears do not represent a serious threat to the economy. A further approach
regards the explosive increase of trade credits and inter-enterprise arrears
as part of an adjustment from centrally planned economies, where the use
of inter-enterprise credits was generally forbidden,2 to levels comparable to
Western market economies (Begg and Portes, 1993b).
However, CEEC experiences clearly show that inter-enterprise arrears can
rapidly accumulate to form an interlocking web of arrears. The consequent
congestion of the payment system from non-payment of bills puts suppliers
in ﬁnancial distress because they cannot pay their own bills. As shown by
Berglöf and Roland (1998), the interlocking nature of inter-enterprise arrears
can raise the problem of soft budget constraints (SBCs).3 They analyse SBCs
as a dynamic commitment problem in the presence of irreversible investments
and allow for the possibility of spill-over eﬀects due to trade linkages. It is
assumed that the return from a good project decreases with the number of
liquidated projects so a government or bank faces the potentially extremely
costly situation where liquidation of bad ﬁrms reduces the pay-oﬀ of good
ﬁrms. The government or (state-owned) bank is therefore inclined to rescue
bad ﬁrms to prevent harm to good ﬁrms. These spill-over eﬀects, due to
strong one-to-one relations between suppliers and buyers, may induce SBCs.
Thus, trade credits become a prolongation of SBCs backed by an awareness
that chains of arrears or an interlocking web of arrears will likely lead to a
government bailout. Therefore, while individual ﬁrms are not “too big to
2Notable exceptions were found, e.g. in Hungary (Buch, 1996).
3Kornai’s (1979, 1980) seminal work on soft budget constraints refers to a situation
where a loss-making ﬁrm is bailed out to guarantee its survival.
5fail,” they can, in aggregate, be “too many to fail.”4 Perotti (1998) shows
theoretically that enterprises might collusively accumulate trade credits when
they expect to be bailed out by a government that wants to avoid a pull-down
of good ﬁrms chain-linked to bad ﬁrms. Thus, suppliers strategically extend
credits to their customers knowing it is unlikely the credits will ever be paid
back.
The Romanian experience provides a highly illustrative example of collu-
sive behaviour among ﬁrms. With the launch of economic reforms in the early
1990s, Romania experienced a drastic acceleration of inter-enterprise arrears.
Enterprises feared damaging eﬀects from the blockage of the payment sys-
tem which they saw as responsible for the fall in output,5 and pressured the
government to deal with the problem.6 At the end of 1991,7 after the failure
of various attempts to reduce arrears, the government instituted a general
bailout described as a “global compensation” plan to wipe away nearly all
inter-enterprise arrears.8 Such ﬁnancial relief did little to solve the problem.
Ahead of the government’s action, inter-enterprise arrears rose on the near-
certainty of an impending bailout. Moreover, as discussed by Perotti (1998),
moral hazard problems were worsened because the government was unable
to credibly convince ﬁrms the bailout would not continue. Despite passing
a new law on enterprise ﬁnancial discipline9 and public announcements that
there would be no further bailouts, ﬁrms continued to bet on further rescue
eﬀorts (Clifton and Khan, 1993; Perotti, 1998) and inter-enterprise arrears
4Mitchell (1998) uses the term “too many to fail” to describe the situation where it is
more costly to close a large number of banks than bail them out.
5Real GDP decreased by 5.6% in 1990 and 12.9% in 1991 (EBRD, 2001).
6Inﬂation sharply increased — partly because of rising inter-enterprise arrears — which
also drove the need to ﬁnd a quick solution to the arrears crisis (Clifton and Khan, 1993).
7Inter-enterprise arrears reached about 50% of GDP (Clifton and Khan, 1993).
8In practice, the government asked all ﬁrms to list their arrears with other ﬁrms or the
state. Banks gave credits with government guarantee and eventually cleared the backlog
of arrears (Clifton and Khan, 1993).
9The law on ﬁnancial discipline (Law 76) spells out the following measures:
“Article 9: Economic agents with overdue payments obligations that remain unsettled
for more than 30 calendar days after the due date shall be considered insolvent. Payments
insolvency must be communicated to the debtor by any creditors, including the state, after
t h ep e r i o do f3 0d a y sh a se x p i r e d .
Article 10: Following a court decision conﬁrming insolvency, creditors can take action
to liquidate unsettled claims of their debtors. Economic agents having unsettled claims
shall be sued and subjected to compulsory payment or a forced sale of their assets in the
following order: monetary means, including deposits in banks; inventories of raw materials
and ﬁnished products; claims and ﬁxed assets; and other estate items.
Article 12: The list of economic agents declared insolvent shall be made public.” (Clifton
and Khan, 1993).
6Figure 1: Development of bank credits and inter-enterprise arrears/credits in
Romania 1990-1992, deﬂated by producer price indices, starting date ﬁgure
=100 (from Calvo and Coricelli, 1994)
increased after implementation of the global compensation scheme (Figure
1).
The accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears can jeopardise reform eﬀorts
because the lack of ﬁnancial discipline encourages ineﬃcient allocation of re-
sources. Managers have no incentive to restructure or submit to economic
demands. Distortion also arises as nonviable ﬁrms are sustained and the
normal exit of ﬁrms — a driving force for the reallocation of resources to pro-
ductive ﬁrms — is suspended. It becomes diﬃcult for outsiders to diﬀerentiate
between good (economically viable) and bad ﬁrms due to uncertain liquida-
tion values, which complicates the implementation of bankruptcies (Begg and
Portes, 1993a; Perotti, 1999).10
The accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears can also cause inﬂation.
Monetary control can be defeated by ﬁr m st h a tc i r c u m v e n tat i g h tc r e d i t
market by creating their own liquidity through trade credits (e.g. Daianu,
1994). By gaining liquidity, ﬁrms do not feel compelled to rein in prices and
wages or otherwise adjust to market conditions. This fuels inﬂationary pres-
sure and undermines attempts by monetary and ﬁscal authorities to stabilise
the economy (IMF, 2001; OECD, 2002).
The main objective of our empirical testing is to analyse whether nega-
10Ickes and Ryterman (1993a) discuss in detail the importance of good enterprise-level
information for imposing hard budget constraints.
7tive spill-over eﬀects that might eventually set oﬀ chains of arrears can be
identiﬁed in the data. As predicted in the theoretical literature, we expect
interlinkages between ﬁrms to increase the likelihood of SBCs. In the regres-
sion, we include several other variables that might inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s arrears.
The number of employees, as a measure of ﬁrm size, is included. Firm
size can then be linked with overdue trade credits in either of two ways.
First, assuming a paternalistic governmental attitude accounts for a lack of
ﬁnancial discipline (Kornai, 1979, 1980), we might expect ﬁrms with large
number of employees to be more prone to run into arrears. The govern-
ment wants to maximise employment or output, so large enterprises feel less
threatened by bankruptcy than small ﬁrms. Thus, the size of a ﬁrm would
have a positive eﬀect on overdue payables. Conversely, ﬁrm size could have
a negative inﬂuence on arrears. According to the literature on trade credits,
larger ﬁrms have better access to bank credits than smaller ﬁrms. They are
regarded as more creditworthy because they are older and better established
and, therefore, less constrained by liquidity. This, in turn, makes them less
dependent on the use of trade credits than small ﬁrms (Petersen and Rajan,
1997; Nilsen, 2002), i.e. big ﬁrms might be in a better position to pay their
bills on time.
Ownership variables are included to test whether certain owners are more
likely to accumulate overdue debts. In line with the theoretical work of
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), we predict state-owned ﬁrms are less likely
to comply with ﬁnancial discipline.11
Obviously, the ﬁnancial situation of a ﬁrm is a decisive factor in a ﬁrm’s
ability to pay on time. In transition economies, Carlin et al. (2000) ﬁnd
a strong positive correlation between barter, which has similar functions as
trade credits, and ﬁnancial problems of ﬁrms. Overall, ﬁrms in ﬁnancial
distress might be less able to meet their liabilities in due time than healthy
ﬁrms. Thus, we control for the general ﬁnancial situation of ﬁrms in the
regression analyses.
Daianu (1994) argues that the degree of outward orientation of a ﬁrm
can be crucial for avoiding chain links between ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm exports to
foreign markets with liquid customers that follow prudent business practices,
it may escape the network trap of inter-enterprise arrears within the country.
Therefore a variable reﬂecting outward-orientation of a ﬁrm is included.
11Again, it can be argued that state-owned ﬁrms have better access to bank ﬁnancing
and thus are less likely to use (over-) extended credit periods.
83T h e s u r v e y d a t a
The data used to test the aforementioned hypotheses is based on a detailed
survey of several transition economies conducted at the end of 1996 and be-
ginning of 1997 by LICOS (Centre for Transition Economies, K.U. Leuven,
Belgium) under the framework of the Phare-Ace network’s “Understanding
Enterprises in Transition”. Firms were surveyed in several CEECs, includ-
ing 123 in Hungary and 126 in Romania. The present study is based on a
sub-sample of this original data set and excludes ﬁrms with incomplete in-
formation. Hungary and Romania were chosen because of their diﬀerences:
Hungary is among the most advanced CEECs, while Romania lags most
CEECs in its economic progress.12 The choice of these two permits us to test
for country diﬀerences that explain the accumulation of debts. Descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 1 in the appendix.
In the survey, ﬁrms were asked about the structure and maturities of
their liabilities and receivables. The data set not only includes to whom the
receivables are owed and to whom the liabilities have to be paid, but also
whether they are overdue. To test the hypothesis that inter-enterprise arrears
induce negative spill-over eﬀects, the survey provides a basis for creating
dummies indicating whether a ﬁrm has outstanding receivables and overdue
liabilities. In both countries, most overdue payables of ﬁrms are owed to other
ﬁrms. Firms are less likely to default to banks or the government. A similar
picture arises for overdue receivables: ﬁrms, rather than households, banks
and the state administration,13 are more likely to default on their payment
obligations.
Pursuing our hypothesis that the size of a ﬁrm aﬀects the willingness or
ability to comply with ﬁnancial obligations, we include the number of employ-
ees in the regressions. The average Romanian ﬁrm is quite large compared
to ﬁrms in Hungary. This reﬂects the fact that the Romanian economy was,
and still is, more centralised with its huge conglomerates intact.
T h eo w n e r s h i ps t r u c t u r eo fﬁrms also varies between the two countries. In
Romania, the privatisation process is less advanced than in Hungary, where
12The European Commission’s latest “Report on the progress of candidate countries
towards meeting the economic criteria for accession” (2001), rates Hungary as a functioning
market economy that should be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market
forces within the EU. Romania, in contrast, does not yet meet the economic criteria for
membership. The diﬀerences in per capita income were quite large. In 1999, GDP per
capita was $4,775 in Hungary and $1,512 in Romania (EBRD, 2001).
13“Receivables from state administration” includes subsidies and grants.
9most state-owned companies are already privatised. We create dummies that
indicate whether a ﬁrm is state-owned, privatised14 or de novo.T h el a s tt y p e ,
which is the omitted variable in the regressions, is deﬁned as a ﬁrm that since
its establishment is 100% privately owned and founded after January 1, 1990.
As mentioned, the overall ﬁnancial situation can be a decisive factor for
the accumulation of payables. Thus, a variable accounting for the ability
to pay is considered. Firms were asked if they have experienced ﬁnancial
diﬃculties since 1989 and in which year. We were able to construct dum-
mies indicating diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial distress. Admittedly, using a
measure of the ﬁnancial situation of a ﬁrm based on a managerial evaluation
rather than ﬁnancial statements (e.g. balance sheet, proﬁt/loss or cash ﬂow)
may be controversial. However, we believe a managerial assessment gives a
good overall picture of the liquidity constraints the ﬁrm faced. Furthermore,
complete information e.g. about sales and proﬁt/loss is often unavailable.
To test whether ﬁrms are able to avoid networks of arrears in domestic
markets by exporting their products, we used a dummy that reﬂects the
export-orientation of a ﬁrm. We deﬁne a ﬁrm as export-oriented when at
least 50% of its products are sold abroad. In Hungary, 24% of all sample
ﬁrms exported more than 50% of their products. In Romania, only 9% of
the surveyed ﬁrms were strongly export-oriented.15
4 An empirical snapshot
Our empirical testing provides a snapshot of the two economies. Our main
question is whether ﬁrms are more likely to have overdue liabilities because of
their overdue receivables. In the ﬁrst regressions (Tables 2 and 3 in columns
1 and 2), we test for the likelihood that a ﬁrm has defaulted on any of its
outstanding debts. In doing so, we infer a diﬀerence between the accumula-
tion of any arrears a ﬁrm has and its inter-enterprise arrears. The dependent
variable equals 1 if the ﬁrm has outstanding debts16 and zero otherwise. Due
to the discrete dependent variable, we use a logit model. The results for
Hungary are presented in Table 2 and for Romania in Table 3. To identify
14The category “privatised ﬁrms” includes enterprises owned by insiders.
15The view that Hungary is more outward-oriented than Romania is further evidenced
by its share of trade in GDP deﬁned as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP. In
1997, the share of trade in GDP was 90.2% for Hungary and 53.9% for Romania (EBRD,
2001).
16This includes outstanding debts to other ﬁrms, to the bank and to the budget.
10chains of arrears, a dummy for outstanding receivables from trading part-
ners, banks, households and the budget is included. We control for further
factors that might increase the likelihood of a ﬁrm running into arrears. As
argued above, ﬁrm size, ownership structure and the ﬁrm’s overall ﬁnancial
situation may inﬂuence its ability or willingness to meet its ﬁnancial obliga-
tions. In addition, a dummy representing the export-orientation of the ﬁrm is
included, because ﬁrms that can escape the network of arrears by exporting
to other markets may be in a healthier position and do better job of paying
their bills on time.
In Hungary, arrears appear to be largely determined by the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. Overdue receivables, as well as ownership structure and export
orientation have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm arrears. For logit models, the
estimated coeﬃcients do not necessarily have a direct economic interpreta-
tion (Greene, 1997). Thus, to get an estimate of the magnitude of the impact
of a particular variable, marginal eﬀects are calculated. Positive coeﬃcients
indicate an increase in the probability that the ﬁrm has to report overdue lia-
bilities. For Hungary, the probability is highest for the variable representing
ﬁnancial diﬃculties. If the variable changes from 0 (no ﬁnancial diﬃculties
for three or more years) to 1 (ﬁnancial diﬃculties for at least three years), the
probability that a ﬁrm has overdue liabilities increases about 35%.17 In the
second regression of Tables 2, ownership variables and a variable for export-
orientation of a ﬁrm are added. The results of the ﬁrst regression remain
largely unchanged. Although overdue receivables and the variable for state
ownership are not signiﬁcant, marginal eﬀects have a value of around 20%
(positive in the ﬁrst case and negative in the latter).
The results for Romania diﬀer strongly from the Hungarian results. As
indicated in Table 3, overdue liabilities of a ﬁrm are strongly explained by
overdue receivables; the marginal eﬀect amounts to 25% whereas ﬁnancial
diﬃculties a ﬁrm faces are not decisive for having overdue liabilities. As
can be inferred from the second regression of Table 3, state ownership seems
to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on overdue liabilities of a ﬁrm (with a marginal
eﬀect of 24%). The probability for having overdue liabilities subject to having
overdue receivables increases to 31%.
In both countries, employment has no eﬀect on the likelihood of a ﬁrm
running into arrears. This it also true for export orientation, although the
17We considered diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial diﬃculty, but basically they did not aﬀect
our results.
11negative sign implies that an increase in exports reduces the likelihood of
arrears.
Regressions 3 and 4 in both tables present an estimation of the likelihood
of a ﬁrm’s default on obligations to trading partners as a function of its
outstanding receivables from trade with other ﬁrms. The results are largely
the same. In the case of Romania, the idea of interlinkages between ﬁrms is
stronger: the marginal eﬀect rises to over 70% when enterprise transactions
are considered alone.
5 Discussion of the results
The empirical results should be taken as a snapshot of the two economies.
We address the stock — not the ﬂow — of arrears. No time series are used.
Moreover, due to the data limitations, we could not include variables with
possible explanatory value such as industry-speciﬁc characteristics and acces-
sibility to bank ﬁnancing. Despite this, the results are revealing and provide
strong evidence of that chains of arrears existed in the Romanian economy
even after more than seven years of transition. Considering the development
of inter-enterprise arrears in recent years (see Figure 2 below), chains of ar-
rears probably continue to present a systematic risk for the country. In the
Hungarian sample, as in Western market countries, a ﬁrm’s overdue liabilities
were generally determined by its ﬁnancial situation, indicating that chains of
arrears have been largely broken up. Firms which are more constrained by
liquidity or which lack easy access to bank ﬁnance rely more heavily on trade
credits (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). This suggests ﬁrms in Hungary have
already moved to more market-oriented conditions and practices. In the case
of Romania, the ownership structure of ﬁrms also inﬂuenced the likelihood
that a ﬁrm will run into arrears. State-owned and certain privately-owned
ﬁrms were more likely to run into arrears.
Why would a country allow itself to stumble into an interlocking web of
arrears? As already pointed out, a multitude of causes have been put forward
to explain this undesirable outcome. Early in the transition process, a surge
of trade credits is mainly seen as a natural response to the credit crunch
that ﬁrms faced after the launch of tight credit policies to keep inﬂation
under control and force ﬁrms to comply with ﬁnancial discipline.18 Thus,
18Using macroeconomic data for Russia, Kim et al. (2001) found out that the lack of
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Figure 2: Development of enterprise payment arrears in Romania, 1995-1999
ﬁrms had to rely on other ﬁnancial sources, i.e. trade credits, to escape the
liquidity squeeze (Calvo and Coricelli, 1994; Perotti, 1999; Commander and
Mummsen, 2000). After the implementation of stabilisation programmes
in CEECs, most experience a sharp increase in trade arrears. Some gov-
ernments, such as Hungary’s, staunchly resisted bailing out ﬁrms,19 while
others undertook massive rescue operations. Berglöf and Bolton (2002) ar-
gue that these divergent policies at the start of transition already opened up
the “Great Divide” in economic and ﬁnancial development of CEECs. The
evolution of trade credits, as well as overdue trade credits, merely illustrates
broader diﬀerences among CEECs in making the move to market-oriented
economies. While the trade-credits-in-arrears situation has yet to stabilise
in Romania, the situation in Hungary is quite stable (Kornai, 2001). Indeed,
one can observe a sharp increase in enterprise payment arrears in Romania
(see Figure 2), which supports the hypothesis that trade arrears are continue
to be a severe problem for the economy as also pointed out by the IMF (2001)
and the OECD (2002).
What determines whether an economy falls into an arrears crisis or quickly
adjusts to a more market-oriented behaviour? Why is the outcome in Roma-
trade credits.
19Although many Hungarian ﬁrms found themselves “waiting in line” for payments in
the early 1990s. This is the freeze-up of the payments system where creditors cannot pay
their bills because they have outstanding receivables from their own customers (Mitchell,
1993).
13n i as od i ﬀerent from more advanced transition countries such as Hungary?
What determines collusive behaviour of ﬁrms?
Romania notably failed to establish such market-supporting institutions
as working bankruptcy procedures. Bankruptcy laws and their consistent
enforcement20,21 are essential in market economies because they force the
precise deﬁning of property rights and the exit from the market of unprof-
itable ﬁrms in order to free up resources for productive use. Perhaps most
importantly, the threat of bankruptcy imposes ﬁnancial discipline on the
debtor (Mitchell, 1993). Which is to say that ﬁrms not threatened by sanc-
tions feel no obligation to meet their ﬁnancial commitments as the threatened
costs and sanctions are minor. The Romanian government failed to signal
its strong commitment to imposing ﬁnancial discipline on ﬁrms, ﬁnding it
politically and socially expedient to allow the continuation of economically
nonviable ﬁrms. Additionally, the combination of long-term historical ties
between ﬁrms combined with the assurance of government support induces
ﬁrms to grant credit to uncreditworthy customers. This collusive outcome is
further supported by the lack of alternative markets with liquid customers
(Perotti, 1999).
Av e r yd i ﬀerent picture emerges in Hungary. The rapid increase of enter-
prise arrears in the early 1990s was a decisive factor in the implementation
of a tough bankruptcy law in 1992. The law contained an “automatic trig-
gering” clause, whereby managers were required to ﬁle for reorganisation or
liquidation within eight days when they had arrears exceeding ninety days
(Gray et al., 1996).22 The Ministry of Finance adamantly rejected political
calls for a bailout of enterprises, seeking instead to prevent the softening of
budget constraints and enforce ﬁnancial discipline (Mizsei, 1994). In such
an environment, characterised by a credible commitment to economic re-
forms, ﬁrms quickly adopted market rules and learned to deal with overdue
credits (e.g. by stopping deliveries to customers, requiring advance payment
or denying credit). Chains of mutual debt among enterprises were rapidly
broken up. Trade creditors were soon aggressive in forcing ﬁrms to comply
20Especially in transition countries, political constraints such as vested interests of of-
ﬁcials in preventing closure of ﬁrms, are often an obstacle to implementing bankruptcies
eﬀectively (Mitchell, 1993).
21Ineﬃciencies with bankruptcy proceedings can also be caused by a lack of aggressive-
ness on the part of creditors in insisting on repayment (Mitchell, 1993).
22The “automatic triggering” clause helped precipitate a massive wave of corporate fail-
ures that overwhelmed Hungary’s bankruptcy courts. At the end of 1993, the government




















































Figure 3: Degree of monetisation of transition economies (1999)
with their ﬁnancial obligations (Mitchell, 1993). As Schaﬀer (1998) notes,
trade arrears for Hungarians are generally treated as part of normal business
practice as in advanced market economies.
Low ﬁnancial intermediation is often blamed for mounting overdue trade
credits. Well-functioning ﬁnancial markets are necessary to provide liquidity
to creditworthy ﬁrms. With alternate ﬁnancial sources unavailable, ﬁrms use
trade credits more likely to avoid a liquidity squeeze. In Figures 3 and 4,
two standard measures are given: national ﬁnancial development reﬂected
in broad money and credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP.
Financial intermediation is low in all transition countries, but, as shown, it
is particularly low in Romania.23 Without alternative sources of ﬁnancing
or high opportunity costs for bank lending in comparison to the use of trade
credits,24 ﬁrms are prone to rely on trade credits.
However, as noted by Berglöf and Bolton (2002), underdeveloped ﬁnan-
cial markets are largely an outcome of institutional backwardness and can be
linked to progress in introducing market reforms. An environment charac-
terised by macroeconomic imbalances, unenforceable contracts, soft budget
constraints on ﬁrms and banks, and an overall weak trust in the domestic
23In contrast, credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is much higher in
western market economies, in 1996, e.g., 154% (USA) and 104.9% (Germany). The same
is the case for M2/GDP. In 1996, this measure amounts to 59% in the USA and 62% in
Germany (World Bank, 1998).
24The price of trade credits in advanced market economies, in contrast, is generally high
because ﬁrms lose their early payment discount. This corresponds to an annual interest
rate over 24% (Jaﬀee and Stiglitz, 1990). In such cases, trade credit ﬁnance could be









































































Figure 4: Credit to the private sector (1999)
economy, undermines ﬁnancial sector development.
A further factor complicates the establishment of a working banking sec-
tor in transition economies. Banks often face problems assessing the ﬁnancial
viability of a ﬁrm because information systems are undeveloped and fail to
pool basic credit information.25 An interlocking web of arrears makes it al-
most impossible to distinguish between “good” and “bad” ﬁrms, i.e. evaluate
creditworthiness (Perotti, 1999). Banks thus may prefer lending to state-
owned ﬁrms they have known for years rather than new ﬁrms. Linkages be-
tween state-owned ﬁrms and banks, which are also frequently state-owned,26
may prevent credit from being allocated eﬃciently. Moreover, privatisation
is harder if ﬁrms are burdened with arrears of payments (Begg and Portes,
1993b).
Although it is generally agreed that the development of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem can have positive eﬀects on economic growth (see e.g. King and Levine,
1993a and 1993b) and that ﬁnancial markets are necessary for eﬀective re-
structuring and hardening of budget constraints of ﬁrms (see e.g. Ickes and
Ryterman, 1993b), a basic institutional framework needs to exist to pro-
mote the evolution of capital markets. This raises a fundamental follow-up
question: Why did some CEEC governments managed to resist bailouts and
vested interests better than other countries?
25This is true even in advanced transition countries such as the Czech Republic (Business
Central Europe, 2000)
26In 2000, Hungary’s state-owned banks held 8.6% of total assets, while in Romania,
state-owned banks controlled 50% of total assets (EBRD, 2001).
16Failure to move quickly to a market-oriented economy could partly ac-
count for a certain degree of economic backwardness. All transition countries
inherited economic distortions from the planned economy, but there was a
large variation in starting points when they began to move towards a mar-
ket economy. De Melo et al. (1997) observes that the Romanian economy
was in much poorer shape than Hungary’s with regard to macroeconomic
distortions, development and over-industrialisation. Due to Romania’s more
substantial misallocation of resources, the social and economic costs of re-
forms (e.g. large layoﬀs without alternative job prospects) were probably
much larger than for countries such as Hungary. Transition reforms in Ro-
mania were so onerous that they threatened to provoke a public backlash,
and consequently weakened political support for reforms (Daianu, 1999).27
Political constraints seem to have been decisive in preventing Romania from
embracing reform.
Favorable geographical conditions, such as the proximity to the Western
markets, may also play a role in encouraging the move to a market economy
(Perotti, 1999). The prospect of EU membership has had strong leverage
eﬀects on reforms by acting as an “outside anchor” that discourages inertia
and reform backsliding. Indeed, it has even spurred economic reform in
some cases (Berglöf and Roland, 1997; Fischer and Sahay, 2000). Hungary
is currently a front-runner among EU accession candidates, while Romania
trails at the rear of the pack.28
6 Conclusion and policy implications
Using a simple empirical framework, we tested for the presence of chains
of arrears in two transition economies, Hungary and Romania. Our results
suggest that, while strong trade linkages had been broken up in Hungary,
this was not the case for Romania. Assumably, trade credits still represent a
systemic risk to the Romanian economy. Country experiences show that the
problem of arrears is closely linked with the ability to adjust to structural
27This was seen in the last election. In 1997, a reformist centre-right coalition came into
power and introduced major reforms based on “shock therapy.” These costly reforms failed
to prevent a drastic decline in industrial output and did not reduce inﬂa t i o na sm u c ha s
hoped. Parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000 returned a less reform-oriented,
social democratic government to power (Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches, 2001).
28As of July 2002, Hungary had closed 26 of 31 chapters in the acquis communautaire,
the basis of accession negotiations between the EU and candidate countries. At that time,
Romania had closed 13 chapters (European Commission, 2002).
17changes, as well as the credibility of the national stabilisation programme
early in transition and institutional development in the long run. After a
decade of transition in central and eastern Europe, it is clear that build-
ing market-oriented institutions and changing government perceptions is a
complex, time-consuming challenge.
What should a government do in the short run if it faces a large stock
and ﬂow of inter-enterprise arrears and its economy is susceptible to a chain
of arrears? There are two extreme positions. The ﬁrst, as e.g. proposed by
Schaﬀer (2000), is to do nothing. The alternative is to implement a general
bailout of ﬁrms in arrears. Both strategies carry severe consequences. The
ﬁrst strategy is advisable only if ﬁrms already apply basic credit mechanisms
and no interlocking webs of arrears have yet formed. The negative spill-over
eﬀects generated by this approach can put viable ﬁrms at risk. The sec-
ond strategy solves the stock problem of arrears in the short-term, but gives
rise to serious moral hazard problems. Further, a stringent liquidation of
ﬁr m si na r r e a r si sd i ﬃcult to enforce because the state lacks information to
distinguish between good and bad ﬁrms. In the short-run, the government
should, in principle, signal its commitment to economic reforms by liquidat-
ing ineﬃcient ﬁrms. Indeed, Stiglitz (1994, p. 238) argues this is “perhaps
the most important commitment.” In Romania’s case, however, such a com-
mitment would have extended mainly to state-run utility companies because
they were the biggest actors in accumulating enterprise arrears (Santarossa,
2001; OECD, 2002). Rather than setting a good example, the state itself
may be reluctant to follow basic market economy principles.
For less advanced CEECs to cross the “Great Divide” and escape the
transition trap, they should focus on building up market-supporting institu-
tions and work to improve conﬁdence in government policies and competitive
markets. The state is still overinvolved in the Romanian economy which im-
pedes market-based adjustments such as private sector development (OECD,
2002). The inﬂow of foreign direct investments should be promoted as a way
to impose market-oriented practices and infuse liquidity into the country.
Of course, this is an admittedly recursive goal, given that attracting foreign
capital is conditioned on the presence of functional institutions and economic
stability. In this context, it is important to point to the interdependencies
of policy measures. For example, sustained low inﬂation rates can only be
achieved if budget constraints are hardened. After over a decade of transi-
tion, it is clear that each step of these countries towards the market economy
18marks more than forward progress, it also leaves an imprint of proof that
its policymakers have once again avoided pitfalls never anticipated at the
journey’s start.
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23Hungary Romania
number of ﬁrms in the sample 78 80
percentage of ﬁrms with
overdue liabilities to banks
overdue liabilities to the government
overdue liabilities to other ﬁrms
overdue receivables owed to banks,
the government and households
overdue receivables owed to other ﬁrms
ﬁnancial diﬃculties
























Source: own calculations using survey data
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
24Dependent variable overdue liabilities
overdue liabilities
to other ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant -1.0448 -0.8628 -1.8710∗∗ -1.7237∗∗
(-1.60) (-1.27) (-2.33) (-2.09)
employment -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002
(-0.76) (-0.16) (-0.07) (0.33)
(-0.0001)( - 0 . 0 0 0 1) -0.0001 (0.0001)
ﬁnancial 1.3405∗∗ 1.4103∗∗ 0.8651∗ 0.9318∗
diﬃculties (2.62) (2.67) (1.71)( 1.80)
(0.3341)( 0 . 3 5 15) (0.1991)( 0 . 2 139)
overdue 0.5935 0.7717 1.1202 1.3420
receivables+ (0.85) (1.04) (1.34) (1.53)










no. of obs. 78 78 78 78
χ2 8.43 9.92 5.94 7.08
Prob>χ2 0.038 0.130 . 1150 . 3 13
Estimation method: Logit model
Notes: ∗ =s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ =signiﬁcant at 5%,
+ in regressions (3) and (4) overdue receivables from trade included
t-statistics in the ﬁrst, marginal eﬀects in parentheses below
Table 2: Regression results for Hungary
25Dependent variable overdue liabilities
overdue liabilities
to other ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant -1.358∗∗ -1.8912∗∗ -2.5104∗∗ -3.1509∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.51) (-3.05) (-3.24)
employment 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
(1.19) (0.09) (0.89) (-0.01)
(0.0001) (0.0001)0 . 0 0 0 1 -0.0001
ﬁnancial 0.6762 0.1776 0.7709 0.0611
diﬃculties (0.85) (0.18) (0.97) (0.06)
(0.0592) (0.0171) (0.1423) (0.0112)
overdue 2.9165∗∗ 3.2090∗∗ 3.8938∗∗ 4.0157∗∗
receivables+ (3.92) (3.75) (4.33) (4.18)










no. of obs. 80 80 80 80
χ2 35.80 42.34 46.05 50.60
Prob>χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Estimation method: Logit model
Notes: ∗ =s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗ =s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%,
+ in regressions (3) and (4) overdue receivables from trade included
t-statistics in the ﬁrst, marginal eﬀects in parentheses below
Table 3: Regression results for Romania
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